EXPLAINING THE DUTCH AND FRENCH REFERENDA ON THE TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE: ASSESSING THE UTILITY OF THE MULTIPLE STREAMS FRAMEWORK

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7 May 2009
Abstract

of

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by

Erin E. Heath

Statement of Problem
In May and June 2005, voters in the Netherlands and France rejected the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) in national referenda. Explanations by the media and academics were insufficient, as they paid little attention to the discourse of the referendum debates and the role of key political leaders as they campaigned in opposition to and support of the TCE.

Sources of Data
The information presented here was obtained from primary sources including: articles published at the time of the referenda in both U.S. - and foreign-based news periodicals, and from European think tanks; official EU documents, such as the text of the TCE and surveys conducted by the Commission; interviews and speeches given by political leaders; government reports; and articles from peer-reviewed journals.

Conclusions Reached
National leaders who campaigned in support of the ratification of the TCE failed to use the appropriate symbols in their attempts to frame ratification as a gain for Dutch and French citizens. In contrast, the symbols used by opponents of the treaty were far stronger and effective, and were appropriate to attempts to frame ratification as a loss. Thus, opponents in both countries were better able to appeal to the concerns of voters and exerted greater influence over voter opinion and the outcome of the referenda.

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There are not enough words to express my thanks to my parents, who have never failed to support me throughout my life, regardless of what I am endeavoring to do, or the obstacles and frustrations thrown in my path.

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And to my closest of friends...you can now stop asking me "So, are you done with your thesis yet, or what?" But seriously, I can't imagine my life if I had never met you – you've shared in my joys and sorrows, always lending an ear, a smile, a shoulder, or whatever is called for at the time.

Thank you many times over. I love you all.
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INTRODUCTION

In May and June 2005, voters in the Netherlands and France, two founding members of the European Union (EU) and historically pro-integrationist, soundly defeated the adoption of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) in national referenda.\(^1\) The rejection of the TCE resulted in the EU entering a "crisis" period. The purpose of the TCE was to be the next step in European integration by first consolidating the numerous existing treaties governing the European Union, but also creating the tools necessary to make the EU a stronger and more effective international actor. However, in order to become EU law, it was necessary for all 25 member states to approve the TCE, and the rejection of the EU Constitution first by French voters and then again by Dutch voters essentially ended all hopes that the treaty would become EU law.

The resounding rejection of the EU Constitution in both the Netherlands and France was discussed in national print and television media, in international newspapers and magazines, as well as in scholarly journals. A large focus of the stories and analyses was the future of the European Union integration project, and how the member states should or could proceed. However, comparable attention was also given to examining why the Dutch and French voted 'no.' It is this latter discussion that this paper will examine. For the most part, journalists, officials of both national governments and EU institutions, and European Union scholars all identified the rejection of the treaty in the Netherlands and France as voters expressing their discontent on largely domestic issues.

\(^1\) Throughout this paper the terms constitutional treaty, EU Constitution, and treaty will be used interchangeably to refer to the TCE.
such as their governments, economies, immigration, and so forth. While these factors are important, and did play a role in voters’ rejection of the treaty, they are not the whole story.

This paper argues that by using a multiple streams framework analysis, deeper insights into why the Dutch and French voters rejected the TCE are to be found. As will be discussed further in later chapters, the multiple streams framework seeks to explain the policymaking process by examining systemic elements that can influence what issues are on the policy agenda at any given time, and the roles that individuals play in bringing policies about. Thus, a multiple streams framework analysis of the Dutch and French referenda acknowledges the role of domestic factors identified by the popular analyses mentioned earlier, yet it adds an additional dimension by capturing the role of national government officials and their use of framing techniques and symbols in an attempt to influence Dutch and French voters during the lead-up to the referenda. In particular, this analysis reveals that in both the Netherlands and France, those factions opposed to ratification and adoption of the TCE were more successful in framing the debate than were supporting factions. Likewise, those factions opposed to the TCE in both countries were also more successful than pro-constitution forces in the task of first identifying and then using symbols with strong affective components, thereby allowing them to more effectively influence voter opinions. As a result, an enhanced understanding of the outcomes of the Dutch and French referenda on the EU Constitution can be achieved.
This paper is organized into four chapters. Chapter 1 outlines the development of the EU over the course of its history, providing overviews of the major treaties up to the TCE. It will also include a detailed discussion of the EU constitution, examining why it was developed and the major changes and additions from previous treaties. Chapter 2 will examine possible explanations for why the TCE was rejected in the Netherlands and France, particularly claims that the constitution was simply a poorly constructed document, concerns about the creation of a European super-state, as well as interpretations expressed in the media, by scholars, and other observers. This chapter will also provide an overview of the major international relations and European integration theories, identifying their insufficiencies for explaining the Dutch and French referenda. The third chapter will lay out the multiple streams framework as initially developed by John W. Kingdon, while also including the contributions of Nikolaos Zahariadis. Chapter 4 constitutes the heart of this paper, as it uses the multiple streams framework to present an analysis of the Dutch and French referenda. Finally, the conclusion will offer a summarization the arguments in this paper, and briefly discuss the current status of European Union efforts to revive the idea of the treaty, if not the treaty itself.
Chapter 1

A TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE

In order to better understand how and why EU leaders believed a new treaty to be necessary, it is first important to become familiar with the political and legal history of European integration. That is, what led the nations of Europe to begin this process, and how have the rules guiding this process changed, or rather evolved, over time? The following section reviews this history in an attempt to provide some general level of understanding.

European Integration and the Treaties

Interestingly, the impetus for European integration did not come from the nations of Europe, but, rather, was born out of American foreign policy following the Second World War. With economies and infrastructure in shambles, and populations ravaged by unemployment and hunger, the states of Europe were balancing on a dangerous precipice. As such, Secretary of State George C. Marshall believed that, without assistance, Europe would dissolve into economic and political chaos, creating fertile ground for the spread of Communism throughout the continent and a destabilization of the international order ("For European Recovery", 2005). Thus, it was in the U.S. national interest to ensure Europe received the assistance it needed, and the Marshall Plan was conceived as the means to so.

Secretary of State Marshall announced his plan in a speech given at Harvard University in 1947. The crux of the plan was the post-war recovery and reconstruction of
Europe; yet the plan also made it very clear that the United States would only aid such efforts – the U.S. would not do for the Europeans what they should do for themselves. In fact, Marshall (1945) made this point very clear when he noted, “It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for our Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans” (para. 12). Moreover, Marshall (1945) believed that, in order for recovery to be permanent, the Europeans would have to work together, and declared any recovery plan “should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all, European nations” (para. 12). In this way, U.S. assistance was tied to cooperation among European governments.

Europe’s response to the call of the Marshall Plan was born of the integrationist ideas of one man, Jean Monnet, and his collaborations with France’s Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, who, according to Fontaine (2000), desired to make war between his native country and Germany – countries plagued by strife and conflict for centuries – impossible (p. 5). The objectives of both men came together in a proposal Monnet ultimately presented to Schuman outlining a plan to tie the economies of France and Germany together. Specifically, it sought to combine the countries’ coal and steel industries under a common institutional authority – the High Authority – which would oversee production, export and labor issues (Fontaine, 2000, p. 13). However, the Schuman Plan, as it came to be known, was not limited to France and Germany, but also provided for the inclusion of other countries. In 1952, six countries – France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg – ratified the Treaty establishing the
European Coal and Steel Community. The ECSC, as it came to be known, was thus the beginning of the European integration project.

Over the course of the following decades subsequent treaties have defined the evolution of the European integration. In particular, the Treaties of Rome, Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice provide an important context for understanding the development of the constitutional treaty. Thus, the following discussion examines each of these treaties in turn, briefly identifying their purpose and key contributions to European integration.

The Treaties of Rome (1957)

Jean Monnet sought to build upon what had been accomplished by the ECSC and further institutionalize cooperation among European states. Indeed, Monnet believed that states could be united towards a common purpose, causing them to gradually lose sight of their conflicts and differences; the shared experience would, in turn, facilitate continued cooperation in additional areas ("What Jean Monnet Wrought," 1977, p. 2). From this belief, and the efforts of Monnet, came the drafting and ratification of the Treaties of Rome, which created two separate communities. While European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) was forged to expand coordination efforts in the field of energy specifically, it was the treaty establishing the European Economic Community that truly established the foundation of European integration as it is known today. The purpose of the treaty was to promote the economic integration of member states through the establishment of a common market, a customs union, and common policies, all of
which shared the underlying principle of free competition as embodied in four freedoms – free movement of goods, labor, capital, and services among member states. These freedoms have remained central as European integration has continued to develop and expand. The final contribution of the EEC treaty to European integration was the institutional structure it laid out – an Assembly representing the European populous, albeit with limited consultative role; the Council tasked with ensuring policy coordination among member states and given primary decision-making power; the Commission to oversee the Common Market and act as guarantor of the treaty; and lastly, the Court of Justice as the sole body responsible for interpreting the treaty. Subsequent treaties, as it will be shown, have expanded the powers of these institutions, but there have been no changes to their fundamental roles. ("Treaty Establishing," n.d.)


Although the Treaty of Brussels, or the "Merger" Treaty, of 1965 brought the ECSC, EURATOM, and the EEC under the auspices of a single Council and a single Commission, they remained separate communities. The Maastricht Treaty, therefore, represents the first major reform to the institutional structure of European integration as it renamed the EEC to the European Community (EC) and combined the previously three separate communities into a single European Communities. In addition, the new entity of the European Union was created and given a three pillar structure. The first pillar was the European Communities (the EC, EURATOM and the ECSC); characterized by the
pooling of member states' sovereignty in designated areas, decision-making in the first pillar was done according to the Community Method. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) comprised the second and third pillars respectively. The inclusion of these pillars expanded member state cooperation into foreign policy and police and judicial affairs. However, unlike the first pillar, CFSP and JHA decision-making was done via intergovernmental processes, thus making the Council the dominant body and significantly reducing the roles of the Commission and Parliament; the Court of Justice has no authority in these pillars.

Major institutional reforms were not the only accomplishment of the Maastricht Treaty – it also forged the European Monetary Union, which established a common monetary policy for member states and, ultimately, a common currency. Finally, the Maastricht Treaty expanded Community policies from those in the original EEC treaty to include such areas as education and culture, expanded the role of the European Parliament by creating the codecision procedure, and created a formal European Union citizenship. In short, the Maastricht Treaty took European integration well beyond economics and began delving into the more complex and contentious realm of political integration. ("Treaty of Maastricht", n.d.).

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2 The Community Method requires that a policy proposal be initiated by the Commission and is given to the Council and Parliament for a decision. If passed, the policy becomes EU law. Generally, it is the decision of the Council that is the final say, with a decision from the Parliament being considered primarily advisory; however, in those instances where co-decision procedures are required, the Parliament plays a somewhat stronger role. The ECJ is then responsible for ensuring compliance with the new law.
The Amsterdam Treaty (1997)

As with the Maastricht treaty, the Treaty of Amsterdam continued to expand European integration by including more policy areas such as the environment, employment, discrimination and public health among those subjected to the Community method of decision-making. What is more, the Amsterdam treaty sought, for the first time, to address criticisms regarding the EU’s democratic legitimacy, particularly in terms of how Europeans related the EU to their lives – citizenship, civic rights, and access to institutions.

The Amsterdam treaty was, in addition, an attempt to further political integration within the EU. It sought to do so by establishing stronger institutional mechanisms for coordinating foreign policy among member states. For example, qualified majority voting was introduced in certain instances in the CFSP decision-making process ("Amsterdam Treaty," n.d.). The use of qualified majority voting in the CFSP pillar, when applied, prevented one state from having veto power, theoretically increasing the possibility of the EU taking concerted action on issues of foreign policy. In addition, a new post was created within the European Union – the High Representative for CFSP became the face and voice of EU foreign policy, the purpose of which was to allow Europe to present to the international community a more united front on major issues ("Amsterdam Treaty," n.d.).

All of these revisions reflected the recognition on the part of member states that the challenges of the post-Cold War world – globalization, intra-state conflict, the
environment, and the myriad of other issues rising to the fore of international affairs—necessitated the evolution of the European Union in order for it to be an effective regional and global actor. Yet, the Amsterdam treaty left some things unresolved. In particular, at the time of the treaty’s negotiation, the enlargement of the EU to include the newly independent states of Central and Eastern Europe was already under discussion, and it was generally accepted that the next enlargement would require changes to such decision-making procedures as voting (“Amsterdam Treaty,” n.d.). Thus, the Amsterdam treaty set the stage for the next evolution of EU law.

The Nice Treaty (2000)

Mindful of the pending enlargement, the Amsterdam treaty specifically called for an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to be called in order to reevaluate the EU treaties and ensure institutional capacities prior to the accession of the new member states. In short, the goal was to address those items left unresolved in the Amsterdam treaty, known as the “Amsterdam leftovers.” Consequently, the focus of the Nice treaty was relatively narrow – the weighting of votes in the Council, the number of commissioners in the Commission, and the extension of QMV. However, this is not to say it is a simple treaty. (“Treaty of Nice,” n.d.)

During treaty negotiations, then-candidate countries and member states often found themselves in conflict with one another over how to achieve the desired objectives, yet also ensure a degree of fairness and equanimity. As a result of the conflicting
interests, compromise was mostly reached at the lowest common denominator, essentially complicating EU operations further. For instance, although the use of QMV was expanded into more policy areas, a dual majority provision was established that, in addition to reaching a designated proportion of votes, allowed any member state to require that those voting in favor be representative of 62 percent of the EU’s total population (Cini, 2007, p. 40). Finally, as with the Amsterdam treaty before it, the Nice treaty was also seen as more of a temporary measure than a permanent fix. Specifically, the treaty included a post-Nice provision calling for discussion and debate on the future of the Union. This provision left the door open for the events leading up to the TCE.

The Need for a new Treaty

The impetus for the EU constitution arose from a number of concerns held by EU leaders. First, at the most concrete level, were those regarding the institutional and operational aspects of the EU. From Rome to Nice, the various treaties have provided the rules and procedures by which the EU operated, yet these were greatly impacted by membership enlargements. As early as 1995 when the number of member states increased to fifteen, it had become apparent that efficient decision-making in an enlarged EU was more difficult. Moreover, only five years later in 2000, the European Union experienced the largest, single enlargement to date – ten countries from Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the island nations of Malta and Cyprus became member states. As already discussed, the treaties of Amsterdam and Nice were attempts to prepare the
union for the eastern enlargement by overhauling the EU’s internal decision-making procedures and practices. Both treaties failed to achieve this goal, and the Nice Treaty, with its highly complex voting procedures, is widely considered to be one of the worst treaties in the history of the EU (Church and Phinnemore, 2006, p. 19).

To complicate matters more, the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe had only recently emerged from behind the Iron Curtain and out from under the domination of the Soviet regime. As such, these states held particular concerns regarding the extent of their roles and influence in the EU. At the same time, however, founding member states such as France and Germany were unwilling to reduce the influence they had enjoyed since 1952. In this way, issues pertaining to fair representation in EU institutions, the Commission and Council in particular, acquired a greater prominence than before. As a result, the EU constitution was seen as a necessary means by which not only could the errors of the Nice Treaty be corrected, but also by which a long-term model for the European Union could be created, ensuring its ability to operate effectively even with further enlargement.

In addition, the EU’s gradual expansion into more politically-oriented integration was yet another impetus for the TCE. Specifically, EU leaders, pushed by their failure to coordinate positions and effectively respond to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, and despite efforts to form the European Security and Defense Policy and European Rapid Reaction Force, felt more was needed in order to establish a stronger, more coherent role for Europe in global affairs. The Laeken Declaration, in broader terms, also made
reference to this notion, as it described Europe as being at a crossroads, and facing the need to use the integration project to once again further European unity through redefining both the nature of the European Union and its role in a rapidly changing international system. Furthermore, in his acceptance speech for the Charlemagne Prize, Valery Giscard d’Estaing (2003), who served as President of the Convention on the Future of Europe, acknowledged these very points, calling the challenge of the convention one of forging a “new political dimension” in Europe with the aim of reorganizing itself in order to exert more influence in world affairs. Thus, it was the hope that a new treaty could provide the framework necessary to enable member states to act with greater unity and efficacy on major international issues.

Finally, the need for a new treaty stemmed from a need to improve the EU’s status among Europeans. The European Union, from its initial incarnation to its current, has been viewed as an elite-driven project, resulting in debates about the EU’s “democratic deficit.” The status and role of the European Parliament, for example, is often associated with this issue. Although it is the only institution in the EU directly elected by the citizens of member states, its role in the decision making process has remained relatively minimal. Moreover, voter turnout for European elections has consistently been low. Thus, finding ways to engage Europeans in the processes of the

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3 The Laeken Declaration, adopted by the European Council in 2001, outlines its goals for the future of the EU. The declaration identified specific questions on EU powers, treaties, and institutions that needed to be addressed. It also called for the creation of the Convention on the Future of Europe to draft a text to meet the Council’s goals. More information can be found at [http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/Laeken_declaration_en.htm](http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/Laeken_declaration_en.htm)
EU became one of the driving forces behind the European Convention. In fact, Neil MacCormick (2005), a MEP and participant in the convention, made this very point when he described the purpose of the convention as being "aimed at reconnecting the Union with its increasingly alienated citizens" (p. 8). In the Laeken Declaration the achievement of this goal is seen as being done through simplifying the structures and procedures of the EU, and making the EU more accessible and transparent through strengthening its democratic elements like the European Parliament. The TCE, which was the outcome of the European Convention and approved by the European Council in 2004, therefore sought to make the changes called for in the Laeken Declaration a reality, and reinvent the European Union’s in more ways than one.

Key Elements of the TCE

All subsequent treaties since the Treaties of Rome have not been entirely new, but rather have served to primarily revise articles in the founding treaties (although some truly new additions have been included as well). This is, perhaps, where the TCE differs most from its predecessors, for instead of maintaining all previous treaties as separate texts, it combines them all into a single document. Consolidating EU treaties was not the only thing that made the TCE unique. It was also distinguished from other EU treaties because it incorporated the rights and values of citizens with the inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. This was an implicit attempt to establish the European Union as the guardian of Europe’s people and the things they value most – it was the EU’s
promises to its citizens. Although the Charter included some rights found in First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution such as the right to property and the freedoms of religion, expression and assembly, it went far beyond these things to include ideals commonly attributed to the European way of life. Consider for instance the headings within the Charter – Dignity, Freedoms, Equality, Solidarity, Justice, and Citizen’s Rights – each of which highlight rights relatively unique to the European perspective, namely, rights to “integrity of the person,” “health care,” “social security and social assistance,” and “environmental protection” (European Union, 2004, p. 42-52).

Finally, in another major departure from previous treaties, the TCE established a new post for foreign policy – the Union Minister of Foreign Affairs. At the most basic level, this position expands and somewhat strengthened the role of the High Representative of Common Foreign and Security Policy first established in the Amsterdam treaty. Like the High Representative before it, the Foreign Affairs Minister would assist the Council in the development and implementation of foreign policy for the European Union as a whole. The Foreign Affairs Minister, also like its predecessor, was responsible for representing the EU political discussions with other world leaders or third parties in matters relating to foreign and security policy. However, the Union Minister of Foreign Affairs would have arguably enjoyed a position of greater strength and presence than did the High Representative in a number of ways. For example, the Foreign Affairs Minister has authority over “special representatives,” who previously operated
independently of the High Representative.\textsuperscript{4} The representative nature of the Foreign Affairs Minister also expanded from that of the High Representative in that the Minister is responsible for representing the EU’s position in international organizations and conferences, as well as coordinating international action taken by member states. This last part is of particular note as member states would, under the TCE, have been able to the Foreign Affairs Minister to take their seat on the UN Security Council. ("Constitution for Europe,” n.d.).

The above discussion is by no means a comprehensive list of all the new and significant elements in the European constitution, however they do represent some of the biggest innovations incorporated in the text. Given the above background information on the evolution of the constitutional treaty, attention can be turned to examining the rejection of this treaty by Dutch and French voters in 2005.

\textsuperscript{4} The Amsterdam treaty allowed for the appointment of “special representatives” by the Council to act on specific political matters, as was done in the case of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. This is similar to the way the U.S. uses special envoys to certain countries or regions to implement its foreign policy agenda.
Chapter 2

POPULAR EXPLANATIONS OF THE DUTCH AND FRENCH REJECTIONS OF THE EU CONSTITUTION

The idealism of the Laeken Declaration and those involved in the European Convention, however, was not as intensely shared by Europeans at large, as demonstrated by the Dutch and French rejections of the TCE. In the aftermath of the negative outcomes in the Netherlands and France, which left some, if not a fair number, of European scholars and officials dismayed, many sought to weigh in and offer their opinion as to why the TCE failed. Contributors to such explanations included academics, printed media, government officials, and think tanks. Yet while the sources of discourse were relatively varied, the focus of these explanations was primarily on three factors – the TCE itself, concerns that it created a federal Europe, and the reasons of French and Dutch voters themselves.

The Document itself is to Blame

As with virtually all previous European treaties, the EU Constitution faced its share of criticism. One of these criticisms, for example, pertained to the length of the treaty text; that is, the document was far too long. Indeed, *The Times* of London described the constitutional treaty as “monstrously cumbersome” (“A Flawed Document, 2004). Much of the length came from Part III, which specified EU competences and institutional procedures, and its inclusion resulted in the TEC being comprised of 200 pages, 448 articles, 36 protocols, and 50 declarations (Kesselman, et.al., 2006, p. 5). In addition, there were also criticisms about its style. There were those who considered the
text to be poorly written because it was not only repetitive, but made incomprehensible by its legalistic language (Church and Phinnemore, 2006, p. 41). At their essence, these criticisms suggest that the rejection of the TCE by Dutch and French voters is related to the document itself. In particular, its length was a deterrent to voters, preventing them from taking the time to read the text for themselves (copies were delivered to doorsteps in France) and judging it on its merits. Likewise, for those who did make the attempt to read the treaty, the legal style of the text made it very difficult to understand. These two factors combined, according to the arguments above, would thus have led voters to oppose ratification of the constitutional treaty.

The facts, however, do not provide clear evidence of such attitudes influencing voters in the Netherlands and France, as none of these criticisms regarding the characteristics of the treaty itself were cited by voters in exit polls as reasons for their having rejected the treaty. According to the Eurobarometer post-referendum survey for the Netherlands, only six percent of voters of voters, for instance, found the treaty to be too technocratic, juridical or containing too much regulation; similarly, only five percent voted ‘no’ on the basis of the treaty being too complex (European Commission, 2005a, p. 17). Likewise, in France, survey results showed voters to be more concerned with the impact of the constitution on national economic issues than the document itself. Indeed, post-referendum survey results showed that twelve percent felt the document was too complex, and only two percent believed the treaty to be too technocratic, juridical or containing too much regulation (European Commission, 2005b, p. 17). It can therefore
only be concluded that such criticisms did not play a significant role in the ‘no’ votes cast by Dutch and French voters.

Creating a European Super-State?

Although concerns about the document itself have, as previously discussed, been cited by observers as reasons for the rejection of the TCE, another, more fundamental argument was more commonly portrayed. At the heart of this is the overall issue of European integration and its effect on sovereignty.

Concerns about integration and its impact on national sovereignty and national identity, have existed since the inception of the European project, which is why European integration has proceeded in a gradual, treaty by treaty fashion. Generally speaking, EU member states fall into one of two categories. First, there are those that feel the Westphalian model of international relations and its focus on the central role of independent nation-states bears little relevance in the increasingly interdependent nature of the international system today. Then there are those that maintain the sovereign power of nation-states must be preserved to the greatest extent possible while still enabling cooperation among states. Consequently, the central question in this matter is whether European integration should be pursued via either a supranational or intergovernmental approach.

For member states preferring the latter method of integration, the constitutional treaty was viewed as one of the more threatening proposals for the European Union to date. As
Neil MacCormick (2005) noted, the TCE was interpreted as reducing the independence and sovereign nature of member states while simultaneously creating the conditions that would ensure the evolution of the European Union into a super-state (p. 39). Consider, for instance, the arguments of Bill Cash, a member of the British parliament. According to Cash (2003), the Constitution was the means by which the individual nation state would be subordinated, its powers and authority made secondary to those of the European Union (p. 6, 9). Likewise, the inclusion in the treaty of a provision that created a post of Union Minister of Foreign Affairs also left those more skeptical towards European integration feeling as though the TCE would erode national sovereignty. Finn Skovgaard (2007), a Danish citizen who writes about the constitution in an online blog, considered the appointment of the Union Minister of Foreign Affairs by the council to be undemocratic, as it gives power to an unelected post, and thus proved the intent to create a European super-state in order to subvert citizens and nationally elected parliaments (no pag.).

Scholars of European integration refer to the attitudes expressed above as "euroskepticism." Although there is no standard definition for this concept, it can generally be understood as an overall hesitancy to "deepen" integration too far, and especially into the realm of political integration. Furthermore, while euroskepticism exists in virtually all member states, it is more prevalent in some than others. For example, the Scandinavian and Central/Eastern European countries, as well as Great
Britain are known for higher levels of euroskepticism; Great Britain, however, is widely acknowledged as the most euroskeptic member state.

The roots of euroskepticism, one can argue, results, in part, from history. For instance, while France and the Netherlands saw integration as beneficial in both political and economic terms following the destruction they suffered during World War II, the United Kingdom and Denmark emerged from the conflict relatively unscathed. As a result, neither country felt driven into participation in European post-war integration efforts. Indeed, it wasn’t until the 1970s that the United Kingdom and Denmark joined the then European Community. Yet, even after joining the European project, the UK and Denmark remained reluctant participants at best, often seeking to preserve their independent decision-making abilities. Indeed, both countries initially failed to ratify the Maastricht treaty, achieving ratification only after opt-out provisions were granted. Similarly, their experiences under Soviet rule during the Cold War have cause the Central and Eastern European states to be hesitant about pooling sovereignty and relinquishing the decision making authority, even if in small measure, they have only recently regained.

In the case of Great Britain, the historical roots of euroskepticism may go back even further than the post-World War II era. Britain, after all, was the shining hegemon of the 19th Century, overseeing a vast empire and capable of projecting its power and influence across the globe. What is more, it has been suggested that during this time Great Britain

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5 Both the UK and Denmark were granted the right to opt-out of certain provisions of the Maastricht treaty, such as those on monetary union, certain elements of EU social policy, defense, and cooperation in police and civil justice matters.
prioritized its relations with its colonies and the United States over its relations with Europe (Fisher, 2005, p. 26-7). The implication here is one of Great Britain viewing itself as exceptional relative to its continental neighbors, and as such, has placed greater value on sovereignty and national identity.

This is not to say, however, that the Netherlands and France do not value sovereignty or have strong national identities – they do. Rather, it is to say that their experiences during and following World War II and their closer relations with their fellow “continentals” through integration efforts have perhaps resulted in them placing less of an emphasis on sovereignty and national identity when considering matters on Europe. Indeed, Eurobarometer polls after the constitutional referenda appear to support this. According to the post-referendum survey, only 5 percent of French voters cited loss of national sovereignty as a reason for voting against ratification; similarly, only 4 percent voted ‘no’ because they were against European integration, and a mere 2 percent voted no because they do not want a “United States” of Europe (European Commission, 2005b, p. 15). In the Netherlands, 19 percent of voters said they voted against ratification because they feared loss of national sovereignty; however, only 3 percent of voters indicated a loss of Dutch identity as the reason they voted ‘no’ (European Commission, 2005a, p. 15). While the 19 percent of voters citing sovereignty as why they voted ‘no’ appears significant, they are dwarfed by British and Danish voters. According to a special EuroBarometer poll, when asked about their positions on the draft TCE, 50 percent of the British and 32 percent of Danes indicated they opposed it because it would
lead to a loss of sovereignty (European Commission, 2005c, p. 28). Thus, in comparison to member states like Great Britain and Denmark, sovereignty and national identity in the context of attitudes towards European integration overall played less of a role in the Dutch and French debates (the subject of this paper), and therefore bear minimal relevance to the discussion at hand.

Opposition to the TCE in the Netherlands and France
The negative outcomes of the referenda in France and the Netherlands set off a firestorm in which the media, the European Commission, national-level party officials, and European think-tank analysts were espousing their opinions as to why the Dutch and French voted against the treaty. This next section examines some of the more popular explanations in greater detail.

*Why the Dutch Voted “No”*
Rene Cuperus, a Senior Research Fellow at the Wiardi Beckman Foundation, the think-tank of the Dutch Labor Party (PvdA), presents the rejection of the TCE by Dutch voters as primarily a vote against the way in which the European integration project has proceeded until this point, and how it has impacted the Netherlands. For instance, Cuperus (2005) points out that where the European project was once promoted as a means of counterbalancing the seeming unchecked and rampant American-style globalization, the common perception among Dutch today is that the European Union has
instead been embracing this very same model (p. 6). Indeed, the Dutch believe that commitment to the European Social Model has been forsaken as internal market policies and liberalization efforts have resulted in some states and groups in the European economy benefitting while others have faltered (Cuperus, 2005, p. 6). The introduction of the Euro is an example of this. Specifically, the Dutch widely considered the adoption of the Euro to have caused inflation, which has been viewed as placing additional burdens on the Netherlands, particularly since per capita the Dutch are the largest net contributor to the EU budget ("Putting," 2005). Thus, for the Dutch, the results of integration have been imbalanced, which has engendered some disillusionment and even malaise towards the European project. Finally, the Dutch perceive the European Union as viewing further integration as the only means by which international issues such as the rising economic power of China and India, ensuring that democracy prevails in Russia, and global terrorism can be addressed effectively (Cuperus, 2005, p. 6-7). In short, these observations suggest that in rejecting the TCE, Dutch voters were simply expressing their uncertainty and fears regarding not only the future direction of the European project, but also how large this project will be allowed to grow.

However, overall concerns regarding the European project weren’t viewed by general observers to be the only reasons the Dutch rejected the TCE. Domestic concerns within the Netherlands, particularly the state of the Dutch economy and political environment, were widely reported to have contributed to the negative outcome of the Dutch referendum. For instance, note was also taken of the impact the political
discontent that had been building in the years prior to the referendum. At the time of the referendum, the violence and unrest resulting from the 2002 killing of populist government leader Pim Fortuyn, and the more recent murder of film-maker Theo van Gogh by an Islamic extremist in 2004 weighed heavily on the minds of the Dutch. Indeed, these events created a sense of insecurity resulting from immigration and terrorism, which weren’t seen as being sufficiently addressed by European integration (“New,” 2005). As these examples demonstrate, in the Netherlands, the future of the European project, the Dutch economy, and national security were all issues identified by observers of the referendum as offering an explanation for the Dutch rejection of the EU constitution.

*Why the French Voted ‘No’*

As was the case with the Dutch, popular discussions on the French rejection of the EU Constitution also tended to highlight concerns among French voters with the European integration process, as well as dissatisfaction with the incumbent government.

In the minds of the French public, European integration came under increasing scrutiny in the year or so prior to the referendum. This scrutiny was primarily fueled by a perceived decline in the French economy as a result of liberalization policies being pushed by Europe, causing French goods to face increasing competition from cheaper products originating from the new member states in the east (Ivaldi, p. 64). What is more, there exists a sense of betrayal among the French due to the fact that the promises
of the Maastricht Treaty to create an advanced European social model and guarantee the protection of worker’s rights through seemed to have fallen short (Ivaldi, 64). In short, integration has long been sold by European elites to their publics as a means of protecting and expanding a social-democracy style of government to a European level. Yet, as the arguments above suggest, the French are increasingly disillusioned with their leader’s calls for further integration when they have done little to spur economic growth, reduce unemployment, and address other economic and social issues.

If the European Union is seen as failing to resolve the issues considered by the French to be central to their political and social identities, France’s leading governmental officials are also seen as part of the problem. This leads to the next explanation of the French rejection of the EU Constitution – the French voted no to the TCE as a means of expressing their discontent with the government of President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin. Indeed, evidence of this dissatisfaction was apparent as early as 2003 when the UMP – the party of Chirac and Raffarin – were resoundingly defeated in regional elections (Ivaldi, p. 49). What is more, voters on the left, who were generally opposed to Chirac’s government in the first place, considered the TCE to be of special and personal interest to President Chirac given his intense involvement in negotiating the treaty (Ivaldi, p. 50). Thus, Chirac’s strong support for the treaty was likely interpreted by the left, which already possessed the inclination to oppose any policy pushed by Chirac, as further evidence that the treaty was unlikely to serve the interests of the French.
As previously mentioned, the explanations of the Dutch and French referenda just outlined were those offered by the media, government officials, and observers of European Union politics. The concerns expressed by Dutch and French voters regarding the approach taken by the EU towards integration, combined with continuing economic woes, and other domestic issues are indeed important in understanding the rejection of the EU Constitution in the Netherlands and France. Yet, as it will be shown, while these reasons have their place, and are, in fact, taken into account in by the multiple streams framework, the upcoming multiple streams framework analysis will show that these reasons alone do not provide a complete explanation. Before proceeding directly into a multiple streams analysis of the Dutch and French referenda, however, it is vital to first consider why the multiple streams framework was chosen over prominent international relations and European integration theories.

Theories of International Relations and European Integration

The study of political science, in general, and of international relations in particular, relies on various theoretical approaches for explaining phenomena among and between states. As European integration began, new theories aimed at explaining it grew in prominence. This section will provide a very brief overview of some of the key theoretical approaches in both IR and integration literature. Among the various international relations theories that seek to explain and predict the behavior of states in
the international system, two – realism and constructivism – are of particular note, as the former represents classic theory and the latter more recent contributions to the IR discipline. Between realism and constructivism, however, there exists another strand of IR theory – liberalism – a variant of which is Liberal Intergovernmentalism, and has become one of the preeminent theories of European integration since the 1990s. Finally, in terms of pure integration theory, there is neo-functionalism, which was developed in the 1950s in response to European integration. Although its prominence has decreased, it nonetheless remains a central part of the theoretical literature for EU scholars. However, despite the unquestionable value of each of these approaches to the studies of international relations and European integration, none are suitable for examining the issue at hand.

*Realism*

Realism considers the role of states in international affairs to be primary, and the interests of these states are determined exogenously by the anarchical system of which they are a part. As a result, securing their national interests requires that states maximize their power and security, particularly vis-à-vis other states. Realists therefore view all state actions as being in pursuit of these goals. Moreover, realism suggests that due to operating in a system of anarchy, cooperation among states is virtually impossible, let alone sustainable. This is because the system only serves to promote instability and distrust among states. Consequently, the European Union poses a particular challenge to
realism as integration has not only expanded among the states of Europe since the end of
the Cold War, but has also expanded between them. Realism is particularly insufficient
for examining the Dutch and French referenda on the TCE because it is a systemic-level
paradigm whereas the issue examined here has already been shown to be influenced by
domestic factors, factors that are considered by realism to be of no consequence.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Liberal theories of IR, however, allow for a broader range of actors and interests
than does realism. One approach – liberal intergovernmentalism – has become a
preeminent theory for European integration, and as a result, need be mentioned in any
theoretical discussion regarding the European Union. According to liberal
intergovernmentalism, domestic politics plays a role in state behavior in that they
determine a state's national interests – or preferences. States then pursue these
preferences at the international level. In some instances, these same forces may create
pressure for a government to cooperate with other states. Subsequently, liberal
intergovernmentalism posits that integration becomes the chosen method of states when
they see it as serving their national interest.

Recognizing domestic political factors and the possibility of cooperation among
states are not the only departures that liberal intergovernmentalism makes from realism,
for it also provides for the use of international institutions. The role of institutions,
according to this approach, is to facilitate bargaining between states, much like the way
the Commission sometimes acts as a mediator between member states. However, the influence of institutions in the outcome of bargaining is considered minimal. Rather, the form or nature of cooperative efforts is a derivative of a state's power relative to others, which, in turn, affects its ability to achieve its preferences through successful bargaining.

Given that liberal intergovernmentalism takes into account the influences of domestic politics on state behavior, acknowledges the willingness of states to cooperate, and provides a role (albeit very limited) for institutions, one could quickly surmise that this paradigm would provide a good framework for analyzing the Dutch and French referenda on the TCE. However, as some critiques of this model indicate, this is not the case. Consider, for instance, how Chirac's support of the TCE virtually ignored domestic political forces - major political parties were internally divided, and some of the largest unions and segments of the population considered the TCE to be against France's national interest. What is more, liberal intergovernmentalism assumes that all decisions regarding integration are made by states. The final decision on the TCE, however, was made by individual voters, driven by their own preferences, which, to understand, requires a level of analysis not available with liberal intergovernmentalism.

**Constructivism**

Constructivism, the final IR theory reviewed here, has in recent years become a strong competitor with the rationalist theories. In contrast with these theories, constructivism suggests that the interests of states are developed endogenously through
behavioral interactions (as with social constructivism) or through speech acts (as with Wittgensteinian constructivism). In short, as Alexander Wendt (1992) points out, states’ interests are not static, but change as it situations are evaluated, evolve and then reevaluated (p. 398). Thus, constructivism would view the deepening of integration in the European Union as member states’ reactions to all previous cooperative experiences – which solidified relations and established commonalities over time – as well as changes in the international system, particularly in the post-Cold War era. In this respect, then, constructivism can be looked to for an explanation of how the TCE came about, and the support it had from a majority of member states; but it cannot explain why it was rejected. The outcomes of the Dutch and French referenda, in contrast, are best understood in terms of the motivations of individuals and interest groups within states. Constructivism, with its emphasis on state behavior, is therefore, like the other IR theories, insufficient.

Neo-Functionalism

Whereas the previous theoretical approaches have all been, for the most part, central components of studies of international relations, neo-functionalism was developed first in the 1950s by Ernst Haas for the sole purpose of offering an explanation for European integration. Moreover, the focus of neo-functionalism is at the individual and institutional level, as opposed to the state-centric models comprising most of IR theoretical literature.
The first central element of neo-functionalism is the concept of spillover, which essentially posits that cooperation in one area ultimately leads to cooperation in other areas. The Single Market is a commonly used example of this concept for it virtually eliminated trade barriers between member states, and resulted in a significant increase in transnational trade. Yet countries found that they were also increasingly susceptible to currency fluctuations which, as the argument goes, led member states to recognize the utility of a common currency and the ultimate development of the Euro. However, according to neo-functionalism, spillover – and integration in general – is primarily driven by technocrats, that is driven by experts in a particular policy area who have analyzed the potential of, and developed the impetuses for, facilitating further cooperation. This is in clear contrast to the idea that states are the driving forces behind any cooperative efforts.

Supranationalism is the second major feature of the neo-functionalist paradigm. According to this part of the theory, supranational institutions and decision-making processes are created in order to facilitate cooperation. What is more, as a result of the relationships that build among technocrats and others involved in the policy-making process, these institutions can become independent actors in their own right, developing and pushing their own agendas. Once again, like constructivism, neo-functionalism may offer insight into the development of the constitutional treaty, yet its failure to consider influences at the domestic level within nation states means that it, too, is not suitable for providing and understanding of the rejection of the TCE in the Netherlands and France.
This, then, brings us to the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) as an alternative for analyzing and explaining the Dutch and French referenda. Interestingly, both of the main theoretical approaches to European integration – liberal intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism – offer a glimpse of some of the features that make the MSF useful in this case study. Liberal intergovernmentalism makes brief mention of the influence of domestic groups, which harkens to the “political stream” of the multiple streams framework, but it is not sufficiently developed. Neo-functionalism, and the role it gives technocrats in the development of policy aimed at cooperation, similarly reflects the MSF concept of the “policy stream.” Unfortunately, neither of these approaches truly acknowledges the complexity of the situation surrounding the case of the TCE, in which national citizens – not states or technocrats or institutions – wielded the final decision on a matter of policy and integration. In light of this, it is time to review the multiple streams framework.
Chapter 3

KINGDON’S MULTIPLE STREAMS FRAMEWORK

The Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) was developed by John W. Kingdon as a means of explaining the policymaking process. In doing so, Kingdon (2003) identifies three particular processes that impact the greater policymaking system, which are referred to as “streams.” The three streams are: the problem stream, the policy stream, and the politics stream (p. 16). According to the multiple streams framework, policy is the result of the three streams converging at key points in time. This convergence, in turn, is possible by the opening of a policy window created by changes in either the problem or political streams, thereby presenting an opportunity to take advantage of favorable political conditions and match solutions to problems and visa versa (Kingdon, 2003, p. 20).

However, according to Kingdon (2003), the convergence of the three streams, or coupling as it called, is facilitated by the efforts of policy entrepreneurs (p. 20). Nonetheless, events within these streams can not only work to bring about successful policymaking, but can, as it will be shown, also work to constrain the policymaking process (Kingdon, 2003, p. 18). These streams will now be examined in more detail.

The Problem Stream

The problem stream of the multiple streams framework focuses on how problems are defined, what leads to the recognition of problems as such, and their subsequent rise on the political policy agenda (Kingdon, 2003, p. 19). According to Kingdon (2003), a
problem emerges when a condition – a situation that has been collectively tolerated by a society – is no longer viewed as tolerable, which can result from certain circumstances (p. 109-11). This change in perception can result from several circumstances. First, a condition can emerge as a problem is simply when enough people believe something should be done about it. A problem can also evolve from a condition when that condition fails to continue to meet the values of a society. A prime example of these first two instances of problem definition can be found in the civil rights movements in the United States during the 1960s. Specifically, the discrimination and disenfranchisement of African-Americans came to be viewed as intolerable by large numbers of black and white persons alike; it violated the values and beliefs enshrined in the Constitution and Bill of Rights, and the belief that action must be taken to change American society pervaded. In short, the status of African Americans in U.S. society was seen by enough people to be in violation of American values that it evolved from a condition of the status quo to a problem in need of a solution. Finally, a condition becomes a problem when a comparison falls short, that is if a certain group or groups are perceived as having an advantage over others. For example, the comparison of academic performance by white and Asian students in the United States and their Hispanic and African-American counterparts has led to the emergence of the problem of the “achievement gap.” The consistently lower test scores of Hispanic and black students compared to those of white and Asian students has become a central problem on the policy agenda at both the national level, as well as in states such as California.
Individuals, policy-makers, and a society in general become aware of these circumstances through several means, which include indicators, feedback, and focusing events. Most times, a problem is brought to the attention of policymakers as a result of systematic indicators provided through routine monitoring conducted by various agencies in the public and private sectors; these indicators can supply insight into both the magnitude of the problem as well as any changes within the problem (Kingdon, 2003, p. 90-1). Returning to the previous example of the achievement gap, an indicator for this problem would be standardized test scores. In fact, it was the changes and emerging patterns in these test scores that brought the achievement gap to the attention of the public and policy makers. Feedback, in a somewhat similar manner as indicators, refers to the status of a condition, and for policymakers, is often acquired through monitoring and evaluation studies, citizen complaints, and program administration (Kingdon, 2003, p. 101). In these ways, feedback provides valuable information on any changes to a condition, and depending on the nature of the change, can lead to a condition being identified as a problem, and ultimately result in the problem capturing the attention of policymakers and rising on the agenda.

Focusing events, such as crises and disasters, also draw attention to problems; however they often work in combination with other factors. This, Kingdon (2003) explained, is due to the fact that despite information provided by indicators, problems do not always become evident to policymakers without added emphasis, which focusing events provide (p. 94). Consider the issue of U.S. dependency on foreign oil, which has
re-emerged as a major problem in recent years. It could be argued that hurricane Katrina, which severely damaged refineries in the Gulf coast region, served as a focusing event because American capacity to drill and refine oil was disrupted, causing a need for increased imports. However, the worsening of the situation in Iraq and rising gas prices reinforced what Katrina already showed. As a result, Katrina, as a focusing event, worked in concurrence with other events, and led the previous condition of U.S. reliance on foreign oil to be viewed as a problem; it even became a central issue in the campaign platforms of the 2008 U.S. presidential candidates.

To summarize, the problem stream is an important element in the greater policymaking process. In addition to explaining how problems come to be defined as such, the problem stream also lends understanding to how awareness of a problem is raised. Without such knowledge it becomes far more difficult to understand why some issues are addressed through policy while others are not.

The Policy Stream

The policy stream is the multitude of "policy communities" in which specialists in a given policy area, such as education or transportation, develop "proposals, alternatives, and solutions," which then "float about, being discussed, revised, and discussed again" (Kingdon, 2003, p. 117). In the context of the European Union, this includes not only the various Directorates-General (DG) of the European Commission, but also the European Council, which holds intergovernmental conferences (IGC) for heads of state to discuss
major issues facing the European Union. Despite the fact that policies are constantly in development, or are sometimes waiting for a problem to emerge for which they provide a solution, they are not guaranteed to be adopted. For this reason, Kingdon (2003) posited that two factors in particular determine whether or not a given policy will be implemented. The first is the presence of an “open policy window,” which is a brief opportunity in which a particular policy is viewed as being most favorable for adoption, and results from changes in either the political and/or the problem streams (p. 165, 168). Second, whether a policy is ultimately adopted also depends on whether that policy possesses three particular characteristics: technical feasibility, value acceptability, and future constraints. Technical feasibility refers to how easily and effectively a policy can be implemented; value acceptability addresses how well a policy represents mainstream thinking and the values of specialists; finally, the ability of a policy to anticipate future constraints, particularly those pertaining to costs and public acceptance, also impacts whether a policy is implemented (Kingdon, 2003, p. 131-38). Thus, the policy stream offers valuable insights into why certain policies are chosen over others as viable alternatives.

The Political Stream

The political stream is “composed of such things as [national] mood, pressure group campaigns, election results, partisan or ideological distributions in [legislative bodies], and changes of administration (Kingdon, 2003, p. 145). The national mood, which can
also be thought of in terms of public opinion, captures the sense that a society’s population overall is generally sharing a common train of thought regarding perceived trends occurring within the society at large (Kingdon, 2003, p. 146). In democratic societies, changes in the national mood can impact the political agenda by affecting which issues attract the attention of policy makers as having become particularly salient, and thus ripe for policy action; the reverse is also true (Kingdon, 2003, p. 147).

The United States, for example, has shown dramatic shifts in national mood. In terms of foreign policy, the American public went from general support for the war in Iraq, to a weariness and disillusionment with the second Bush administration’s foreign policy agenda. Recent policy shifts regarding the war in Iraq demonstrate the impact of this on the policy agenda—the U.S. and the Iraqi government began discussing a timetable for the withdrawal of American troops prior to the 2008 presidential elections. Another example is the shift in focus from foreign policy to domestic issues, especially the economy. With rising fuel and food prices, and the housing crisis, the national mood among Americans has turned increasingly negative. As a result, the new foci of the Congressional legislative agenda have been bills aimed to help homeowners facing foreclosure and stabilize credit markets.

Like changes in the national mood, Kingdon also pointed to how electoral outcomes can also explain how various issues come to acquire greater (or lesser) salience in the minds of policymakers. More specifically, as Kingdon (2003) noted, elections that result in changes in administrations and/or political party majority influence the agenda.
and attention of policymakers to certain problems. This is for the simple reason that each administration and/or party has its own particular interests and priorities they seek to promote, thereby pushing new agendas and problems to the fore (p. 154). When the Republican party gained control both houses of the U.S. Congress in the 2002 elections, the influence of party majority on the policy agenda was clear. Under Republican leadership, national security dominated the legislative agenda, and policies that would arguably not have been implemented under a more liberal Congress – suspension of habeas corpus for enemy combatants detained at Guantanamo and wire tapping practices that circumvented FISA regulations – are two examples.

The final element in Kingdon’s political stream is that of pressure group campaigns. According to Kingdon (2003), the activism of various groups in support of or opposition to a given policy problem determines the balance of support for that issue, which, in turn, exerts influence on the agenda, as policymakers are considered to more amenable to supporting a winning cause (p. 150-1). In their recent book, The Israel Lobby, Stephen M. Walt and John Mearsheimer present a similar argument with regards to the influence of Jewish-American organizations on U.S. foreign policy towards Israel, the Palestinian territories, and the Middle East in general. However, as briefly mentioned previously, the three streams just discussed are not likely to cause a problem to be addressed through policy on their own, but rather, the streams are most effective when they can be coupled together. This leads to the final, and perhaps most important factor
in Kingdon's multiple streams framework – the role of policy entrepreneurs and the coupling of the streams.

**Policy Entrepreneurs**

Kingdon (2003) defined policy entrepreneurs as 1) individuals who advocate particular policy proposals, 2) are able to capture the attention of policymakers, and 3) whose contribution to the policy making process lies in their particular abilities to recognize open policy windows and utilize them to link policies to problems or politics and further connecting them to politics (p. 20). However, the most successful policy entrepreneurs possess certain characteristics that enhance their abilities to facilitate the adoption of their proposals. First and foremost, a policy entrepreneur must have what Kingdon (2003) called a "claim to hearing." That is, a policy entrepreneur's advocacy carries legitimacy due to the fact that he or she is recognized for their expertise in the issue at hand, their role as a spokesperson for others, or that they may hold an authoritative position as a decision-maker (p. 180-1). The second characteristic of a policy entrepreneur is that he or she is well connected within the political system or is known for his or her negotiating skills (Kingdon, 2003, p. 181). Finally, tenacity is perhaps, according to Kingdon (2003), a policy entrepreneur's greatest attribute, for a willingness to doggedly pursue a particular agenda lends itself to a greater likelihood of effecting the desired outcome (p. 181). Such skills are clearly important for a policy entrepreneur to possess because they provide him or her with the particular knowledge,
abilities, and determination to more successfully work within the three streams to impact the priority of issues on the agenda at any given time. The best contemporary example of a policy entrepreneur is perhaps former Vice President Al Gore and his work on climate change. As the most visible advocate for mitigating the devastating effects of climate change, Gore has not only succeeded in capturing the attention of policymakers and citizens across the globe alike, but has recognized the shifts in public and government attitudes towards the issue, which thirty years ago were characterized by skepticism. What is more, Al Gore possesses all three of the characteristics of a successful policy entrepreneur identified by Kingdon. Specifically, as a former U.S. Congressman, Senator and Vice President, Gore has a claim to hearing, as his expertise on the climate change issue has earned wide acclaim and respect. Additionally, Al Gore has pushed to get the issue of climate change on the policy agenda since the 1970s as a member of both the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. He has thus established extensive political connections and demonstrated tremendous determination to succeed in the cause.

Regrettably, Kingdon fails to expand on the exact means by which a policy entrepreneur uses these characteristics to the advantage of the particular problem or policy for which they advocate. If, as Kingdon claims, policy entrepreneurs are indeed ultimately responsible for coupling the streams at opportune moments, then such an omission presents a potentially significant problem in the utility of the multiple streams framework. The implications of this are serious considering the central role the policy entrepreneurs in the Netherlands and France played in determining the outcome of the
referenda. Fortunately, however, professor and scholar Nikolaos Zahariadis expanded on the role of policy entrepreneurs in his book *Ambiguity & Choice in Public Policy: political decision making in modern democracies*, picking up where Kingdon left off. According to Zahariadis, policy entrepreneurs succeed in coupling the three streams through the effective manipulation of three primary devices – framing, salami tactics, and symbols.

Framing is a technique used to describe a situation in such a manner as to influence individual choices by emphasizing certain information and downplaying other information. By drawing individuals’ attention to certain aspects of the situation over others, framing generally results in the presentation of potential alternatives, or policies, as either gains or losses (Zahariadis, 2003, p. 89-91). Policy entrepreneurs, in turn, manipulate how an issue or debate is framed in order to generate more positive attitudes towards the particular problem or policy they advocate (Zahariadis, 2003, p. 92). In this way, framing is used to guide and shape individual choice towards a particular desired outcome. To provide a more concrete example of how framing works, one can look to the examination conducted by Thomas E. Nelson, Zoe M. Oxley, and Rosalee A. Clawson (1997). According to their work, the effect of framing is to guide individual choice by providing information as to how an individual should weigh the relative importance of one factor over another when making a decision (p. 226). Nelson et al. (1997) use the issue of nuclear power to demonstrate the effects of framing, often debated in terms of both economic benefits and safety, each of which highlights and emphasizes
different considerations regarding the use of nuclear power (p. 226). Similarly, climate change, which was once perceived as strictly an environmental problem, has increasingly come to be discussed in terms of national and global security issue. Regardless of the issue at hand, the examples of nuclear power and climate change illustrate how frames can influence voter choice. By emphasizing certain information, frames present that information as relatively more important. Additionally, framing seeks to demonstrate how the outcome of a choice based on that information can result in either a gain or a loss for the individual and/or the society at large, whether that outcome is a moratorium on new nuclear power facilities or the construction of a dam.

Salami tactics, which Zahariadis (2003) defined as the manipulation of the sequence in which decisions are made, is the next device policy entrepreneurs can use to couple the streams (p. 93). In other words, a policy entrepreneur uses salami tactics to divide one decision into several in order to minimize opposition, ultimately resulting in an outcome that would otherwise be rejected. This device is primarily effective due to three factors: path dependence, sunk costs, and the endowment effect. According to Zahariadis (2003), path dependence refers to the impact choices already made have on future choices; in particular, a past choice can often preclude other choices from being available in the future, forcing subsequent decisions to follow the course of previous ones (p. 93). In a similar vein, if monetary or other resources have previously been committed in support of a particular cause, then choices that negate such investments are unlikely to be considered as viable alternatives; sunken costs therefore can drive subsequent choices
(Zahariadis, 2003, p. 93). Finally, the endowment effect influences decision making due to the tendency of people to place a higher value on things already in their possession than things yet to be acquired (Zahariadis, 2003, p. 93). In short, by dividing the decision making process into stages, agreements on smaller, related matters are made separately. Thus, salami tactics establish a pattern reinforcing decisions and commitments, biasing all subsequent choices, and virtually ensuring the final desired outcome will be achieved.

Consider, for example, the project of European integration. What once began as limited economic cooperation in the areas of coal and steel among France, Germany, and the Benelux countries has evolved into an organization of 27 member states whose policy coordination efforts have gradually been expanding to include political issues such as cross-border trafficking, climate change, terrorism, and foreign policy. This evolution has essentially occurred by using the salami tactics technique – European and national leaders have slowly sought to deepen the integration among European states on a treaty by treaty basis, with each treaty often adding new areas of cooperation and coordination. As the economies of Europe became ever more interlaced and interdependent, future decisions became dependent on previous ones (path dependence), deintegration became more costly for states (sunken costs); and the peace and security that has resulted from integration became more greatly valued than what they could achieve independently (the endowment effect). Thus, while sixty years ago few would likely have believed that Europe would achieve the level of integration it has today, by proceeding incrementally as the EU has done, it has been driven and able to reach its current state.
Finally, policy entrepreneurs use symbols as a coupling device. As Zahariadis (2003) defined them, symbols are “objects to which people attach political significance,” and “simplify information, arouse interest, provide meaning, and structure conflict” (p. 97). Symbols, then, are particularly powerful and effective means by which policy entrepreneurs can engender support for or opposition to a chosen problem or policy. Moreover, symbols, as it will be shown, played a role in Dutch and French constitutional treaty campaigns, therefore making it imperative to understand both the nature of various symbols as well as how they work.

Elder and Cobb (1983) have posited that all political symbols can be characterized according to three general categories. The first are symbols of political community – the American flag or the French revolution, for instance. Second are symbols associated with regime norms, structures, and roles – these would include legislative bodies such as the U.S. Congress or European parliaments. Finally, there are situational symbols – these include current authorities (i.e. a president, foreign minister, etc), non-governmental political actors such as unions, and/or specific policies and policy issues (p. 36).

Symbols also possess specific attributes that determine how an individual reacts to a given symbol. The affective component of a symbol is that part which elicits an emotional response and determines the direction and intensity of that response; it is the basic determinant of whether a particular symbol is considered to be positive or negative (Elder & Cobb, 1983, p. 41). On the other hand, a symbol’s cognitive component generates a response that is based on the actual knowledge an individual has about what
the symbol represents (Elder & Cobb, 1983, p. 41). 9/11 has become a symbol of political community – it was an experience shared by all Americans, and has changed the way many think about the United States and define the international environment in which it is situated. As a symbol, 9/11 possess both strong affective and cognitive components – the sadness, shock, and fear the attacks elicited among Americans reemerges, and reinforces the sense of global change, insecurity and danger that, as a symbol, 9/11 has come to represent.

Although much of a symbol’s effectiveness is derived from the strength of its affective and cognitive components, Elder and Cobb (1983) have pointed out that a symbol’s power is enhanced when it is applied to a situation that is perceived to be relevant to and consistent with the collective meaning of that symbol. In other words, symbols are used most effectively when appropriately matched with a given situation (p. 57). The situational relevance of a symbol can be assessed through information disseminated from mass media as well as the credibility of the communicator or source (Elder & Cobb, 1983, p. 73).

The use of symbols by policy entrepreneurs as a coupling device can be a delicate endeavor. Because they are used to simplify information and provide meaning, it is vital that policy entrepreneurs choose symbols that will not only sustain the interest of their audience, but more importantly have the same meaning and evoke the same emotional response for almost all members of the population at which the symbol is directed (Zahariadis, 2003, p. 99). Indeed, the effective use of symbols by policy entrepreneurs in
both the Netherlands and France played a major role in the defeat of the constitutional treaty.

To summarize, Kingdon’s multiple stream framework describes how the policymaking process occurs in a fluid and changing environment that can be encompassed in three separate, but interconnected, streams. The problem stream is where issues, through various means, can come to be defined as problems and acquire a more significant place on the policy agenda. The policy stream is where numerous policy alternatives are constantly being developed and suggested. The political stream is the political environment of a given society, in which public opinion, elections, and activist groups all can play a role in agenda setting. When events in these streams are able to be connected together, it becomes more likely that policy will result. This connection, or coupling, is the result of policy entrepreneurs who, having taken advantage of an opportunity presented by the opening of a policy window in either the problem or political streams, can proceed to advance their chosen agenda through the use of particular devices that allow them manipulate information in a way that advances their goal. Having now set forth the theoretical framework underlying the arguments of this paper, it is now time to assess the utility of this framework by applying a multiple streams analysis to the Dutch and French referenda on the TCE.
Chapter 4

ANALYZING THE OUTCOME OF THE REFERENDA ON THE TCE IN THE NETHERLANDS AND FRANCE

The European Union is a unique entity in the world of international affairs, for it operates in a multitude of ways. On the one hand the EU operates in ways that are similar to other international organizations in which a central council – the European Council – discusses the cross border issues facing the organization, such as foreign relations, terrorism, and so forth. Yet the European Union simultaneously demonstrates some more federalist characteristics, exemplified by the fact that EU institutions have sole competence for certain policy areas like the internal market while national parliaments retain the right to legislate on purely national issues. Although imperfect, this can be loosely compared to the manner in which both the U.S. Congress and state legislatures divide law-making among themselves. Due to the uniqueness of the European project and the complex institutional structures it has created, the European Union is not always a perfect fit for established analytical frameworks, a caveat that applies to the multiple streams framework as well. For instance, in the particular case examined here, the problem and policy streams occur at the European level whereas the political stream occurs at the national level within member states. This is in contrast to the application of the framework by Kingdon and Zahariadis, both of whom use the framework solely within a national context. Nonetheless, this is not to say that such analytical frameworks are useless in explaining events in the European Union. As the following section will attempt to demonstrate, the multiple streams framework, compared to the more conventional
analyses presented in the media, does offer additional insights into why the Dutch and French voters rejected the TCE. This is primarily due to the fact that the multiple streams framework captures both the role of policy entrepreneurs play, particularly as it applies to their place in the policy making process, and their use of framing and symbols to promote a certain agenda. The media discussions of the referenda outcomes all but ignore this important factor. Consequently, while the problem and policy streams will be addressed, the discussion of these streams will be more truncated, as the most interesting insights are to be found in the political streams within the Netherlands and France, and, as argued above, the policy entrepreneurs driving the campaigns in the two EU member states.

The European Union and the Problem Stream

Recalling how a window of opportunity can result from changes to the status quo within the problem and/or political streams, and cause some policy options to become more feasible, it can be argued that the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was the result of both a problem window and a political window.

The enlargement of the European Union into Central and Eastern Europe in 2000 created a problem window. Given that the eastern enlargement was to be the largest single enlargement of the European Union to date, the EU attempted to prepare both current institutional structures and the candidate states for membership. This was done through the negotiation of new treaties, as discussed previously, as well as economic aid and reform programs aimed at smoothing the transition of the Central and Eastern
European states to full market economies capable of successfully participating in the EU’s internal single market. Despite such preparations however, the impact of the enlargement on the European Union’s operational abilities could not fully be grasped until years after the enlargement was completed, which was when the first of the new treaties entered into effect. The latest treaty revisions as set forth in the Treaty of Nice, which entered into force in 2003, left many issues unresolved. Moreover, the new complex voting procedures – the result of hard-fought compromise between new member states like Poland that wanted to acquire greater voting power commensurate with its size and old member states like Germany seeking to preserve existing voting power – led to the Nice treaty being widely regarded as a lowest common denominator, and provided less than complete satisfaction to the member states. In a Memorandum to Member States of the Commission (2001), for example, the Secretary-General summarized the agreements reached in the Nice Treaty, including Council decisions made according to the qualified majority voting procedure. Specifically, the new voting procedures essentially required a triple majority – first, any decision must receive the threshold number of votes, which under the current membership of 27 states must represent 73.91 percent of the total possible votes; second, the vote must represent a majority of the member states; and third, if requested, it must be verified that the vote represents at least 62 percent of the total population of the European Union (p. 3). This complex arrangement, according to Edward Best of the European Institute for Policy Analysis (2001), partially addressed the concerns of acceding and existing member states alike.
The 62 percent rule, for instance addressed Poland’s desire to make population count, yet is still allowed for scenarios where larger states, such as Germany, could block decisions by getting support from two of the three remaining largest countries – Great Britain, France, and Italy (p. 5). Overall, the final text of the Nice Treaty strained relations among member states as France and Germany had severe disagreements, the Benelux countries felt as if the smaller countries had lost to the larger ones, and the candidate states were left with the feeling of being of a second-class status compared to current member states (Best, 2001, p. 7). In light of such a situation, the TCE, therefore, became the chosen alternative to not only finally address the problems resulting from enlargement, but to also provide the foundation for the future of the European Union.

In 2003, however, a political window was also opened when the United States began talking of invading Iraq and expanding the War on Terror. The member states of the European Union quickly found themselves divided in their reaction to U.S. machinations to bypass the work of U.N. weapons inspectors in Iraq. France and Germany were among the most vocal critics of military action against the regime of Saddam Hussein. The positions of France and Germany were in opposition to several other member states who expressed their disagreement in what became known as the “letter of eight.” The letter, signed by the leaders of Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, and three central European member states, called for supporting the U.S. position on Iraq. This public division led America’s long-time European allies to be split into two groups – “old Europe” and “new Europe” – by then Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld. However, the “letter of eight” was only the most recent reminder of the EU’s long-time struggle to move beyond economic union and into political union. Although half-hearted efforts to forge increased political integration among the states of Europe can be traced all the way back to efforts to form a European Defense Community (EDC) in the 1950s, more serious steps towards political union were not really taken until the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Maastricht Treaty (CFSP). These efforts have continued to advance to some degree with the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and the European Security Strategy (ESS).\(^6\) Regardless of the progress made, the fissures brought about among the member states in the run-up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq demonstrated that much remained to be accomplished in the arena of political union. In this way, the debate surrounding the invasion of Iraq served to move the problem of achieving European political union towards the top of the agenda.

The Convention on the Future Europe occurred at such a time when new problems had emerged (or reemerged) on the European agenda. The eastern enlargement brought to fore the problems facing an enlarged European Union, and the internal divisions over Iraq caused the implications of an incomplete political union to resurface. Thus, the Convention found itself provided with a window of opportunity to create the means to address these issues and more.

\(^6\) The EDC, ESDP, and ESS all focus on the establishment of a common European defense structure and security strategy. The CFSP was formulated with the purpose to facilitate common foreign policy positions among member states and to enhance the EU’s ability to engage in joint actions.
The European Union and the Policy Stream

As previously discussed, attempts to prepare the European Union for 25 member states had been underway for several years prior to the eastern enlargement. Likewise, the concept of creating a European Union based not solely on economic integration but also political union had been in existence for over fifty years. With the policy windows opened by the enlargement and the prospect of a military invasion of Iraq, the leaders of the Convention on the Future of Europe were presented with a new opportunity to resolve these problems. The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was their attempt to do so.

The unique nature of the European Union means that policy is developed somewhat differently than in the United States or other European democracies. This is an important point to reiterate due to how the policy stream within the European Union context is impacted. As Kingdon described it, the policy stream is a dynamic environment in which experts in the public and private sectors alike are constantly developing and perfecting policy proposals, preparing for a time when problem or policy windows open. In the European Union, however, the policy stream is less dynamic in that the involvement of experts from the private sector is far less prominent. This is because policy at the European level originates primarily from the Commission and/or the European Council. Although the Council, which is comprised of the heads of state and/or government from each member state, tends to be more influenced by domestic concerns, this is somewhat balanced by the Commission. Made up of 24 Directorates-
General (DG), most aptly compared to national government ministries, the Commission is staffed entirely by civil servants known for their expertise in a given field more than their political loyalties. The Commission is therefore generally subject to less outside influence than other national legislative bodies. Thus, the policy stream from which the TCE emerged was more restricted as compared to Kingdon’s concept.

The Political Streams and Policy Entrepreneurs in the Netherlands and France

The Netherlands

Within at least one year prior to the referendum on the European Constitution, the political environment in the Netherlands was one in which a sense of instability and insecurity abounded. As such, the political stream in the Netherlands at the time leading up to and of the referendum was unlikely far from the mind the individual Dutch voter. For example, the ruling coalition government, led by the Netherlands Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende, was fragile at best. Indeed, in the months prior to the referendum, one of the Dutch parties making up the coalition – the leftist party D66 – was considering whether or not to remain part of the coalition. The withdrawal of D66 from the coalition would have taken away the Balkenende Cabinet’s narrow three seat parliamentary majority (Bickerton, 2005a). Recalling that a parliamentary democracy generally requires that a party win a majority of seats, or form a majority through a coalition, in order to control the government, the collapse of the ruling majority can have serious

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7 Political lobbying at the European level has increased in recent years. However, Commission employees do not yet receive the volume of solicitations that U.S. legislators do, for example.
implications for the ability of the government to enact laws and govern. What is more, it is not unlikely that the inability of the Balkenende government to provide a stable ruling coalition would also reflect negatively on any issues, such as the European Constitution, it actively promoted. As such, the uncertain nature of the government would certainly have influenced choices made by the Dutch public.

In addition to the instability threatening the Dutch government, two other factors in the political stream significantly captured the attention of Dutch voters. First, since 2001 the economy in the Netherlands has been in a severe downturn, primarily resulting from the bust of the 1990s economic boom, and causing the Dutch to suffer declining employment levels (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2004). Clearly, the economic situation facing the Netherlands would cause additional concern among the Dutch, particularly as it concerned their ability to ensure their own welfare and that of their families. However, concerns about the ability of their country to compete and succeed in a more globalized economy would compound matters, thus furthering the sense of insecurity. Second, immigration had become a hot-button issue in the Netherlands. As the referendum approached, recent levels of immigration had begun to put increasing pressure on Dutch social security benefits (“Staying Dutch,” 2005). Moreover, the violent murder of filmmaker Theo Van Gogh remained a recent memory, and left the Dutch public with a heightened fear of Muslim extremists in Dutch society (“New,” 2005). Consequently, immigrants presented a double threat—first, by taking advantage of national social security benefits, immigrants cut into the ability of the
government to provide services to native Dutch citizens; second, the presence of extremists among the Muslim immigrant population created a security problem.

Given the parliamentary instability, economic downturn, and concerns about immigration just described, it is no wonder that at the time of the TCE referendum, the national mood in the Netherlands comprised a growing pessimism, sense of insecurity, and even fear. The ability or inability of TCE supporters and opponents in the Netherlands to recognize the prevailing national mood and adopt the appropriate frames and symbols in the debate further explains the rejection of the treaty in the national referendum.

France

As was the case in the Netherlands, the political stream in France similarly presented a hostile environment for the referendum on the constitutional treaty. A government plagued by political scandal and electoral upsets resulted in a national mood that was distrustful of government and filled with uncertainty. In the year prior to the referendum, Chirac’s government faced two high profile scandals. First, in 2004, former Prime Minister and head of the UMP – the party of President Chirac – Alain Juppe, who also had close, longtime personal and political ties with Chirac, was convicted on corruption charges; Chirac, however, continued to publicly support Juppe even after the conviction (Sciolino, 2005). Second, in 2005 and only months before the treaty on the EU Constitution, a number of high level ministers were caught up in a housing scandal.
The scandal revolved around the fact that the ministers were living in luxurious and extravagant residences, which were paid for with public funds at a time when the French government was attempting to institute various budget cuts, including to social programs (Smith, 2005). The disconnect between a government facing serious economic and fiscal problems yet funding a life of luxury for government officials was unlikely to be lost on the French public. Indeed, the belief that the government was no longer demonstrating itself as a trustworthy guarantor of the public interest was reflected in the outcome of the May 2004 regional elections. Chirac’s UMP party suffered a scathing defeat in the regional elections, losing to the Socialist Party and its allies in twenty-one of twenty-six regional elections. The defeat was widely considered a rejection of Chirac and voters’ expression of discontent with recent attempts to reform France’s health care, pension and educational systems, as well as unemployment benefits (Smith, 2004). Like the Dutch, the French were becoming increasingly concerned about their place in a globalized economy and what the future held for them. Government proposals to implement various economic reform measures, particularly those related to pension reform, generated such outrage among labor unions and public servants, leading to one-day strikes (Tagliabue, 2003). This, then, was the environment in which French voters were asked to decide on the important, yet complex, European constitution.
Frames and Symbols in the French and Dutch Debates on the TCE

How then did policy entrepreneurs in the Netherlands and France attempt to couple the three streams in their respective countries? The answer is through the use of framing techniques and political symbols as a means of persuading Dutch and French voters as to the merits, or lack thereof, of the constitutional treaty. However, the two groups of policy entrepreneurs in each country – supporters and opponents of the Constitution – applied these manipulation devices to varying efficiency. More specifically, the use of inappropriate frames and symbols by supporters of the TCE in both the Netherlands and France resulted in the inability of policy entrepreneurs to couple the political stream with the problem and policy streams. In contrast, however, Dutch and French policy entrepreneurs opposing the TCE were more successful in framing the debate and using strong symbols to deliberately thwart the coupling of the three streams.

Framing in the Dutch and French Pro-Constitution Campaigns

In the Netherlands, the campaign for the European constitution was led by the mainstream political parties, including those from both the ruling and opposition parties within the Dutch government. As individuals, government leaders such as Balkenende and other ministers, each acted as policy entrepreneurs, attempting to couple the TCE to the problems and politics facing their Dutch constituents. The primary argument presented in the campaign was that a defeat of the constitutional treaty would result in the unraveling of Europe, and in this way, framed a rejection of the treaty as a loss (Taggart,
This frame was made evident in comments from various ministers, including the Netherlands’ Justice and Economic Affairs ministers, each of whom respectively argued that a vote against the constitutional treaty would return Europe to a state of war and economic crisis (Nijeboer, 2005, p. 400). In addition to presenting a defeat of the treaty as a loss, however, the pro-constitution campaign complemented this effort by framing the TCE itself as a gain, as evidenced in speeches given by Prime Minister Balkenende. By focusing, for example, on the constitutional treaty’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, Balkenende (2005) sought to emphasize the how the treaty would enhance democracy and transparency in Europe and, thus, make Europe stronger (p 9).

In France, supporters of the European constitution were primarily members of the mainstream right, socialist, and green political parties, and considered it France’s duty to ratify the constitutional treat. To be more specific, President Chirac and other high-profile supporters of the constitution believed that given France’s historic role as a driving force of the European project, and failing to ratify and implement the TCE would bring potential disaster to Europe (Taggart, 2006, p. 15). Regardless, the attempt by these persons to imprint a sense of obligation on the voting public, and convince voters of the likely negative consequences of failing to meet this obligation fell short. The failure of the constitution’s supporters to bring about the treaties ratification can be tied to the poor manner in which arguments in favor of the constitutional treaty were presented. Specifically, President Chirac and others failed to couple the TCE with the problem and
political streams due to their inability to adopt the appropriate frames and symbols throughout their campaign to promote the constitutional treaty to French voters.

Proponents of the constitutional treaty approached the document from the perspective that it presented the best solution for the problems facing Europe and ensuring France's continued role as a leading nation within Europe. According to Chirac (2004) the TCE presented benefits to both Europe and France because it would strengthen the European Union's decision-making capabilities and enhance its influence in the international arena. Such a Europe would allow France to take on a more powerful role in Europe, increasing its capability to protect French interests.

Indeed, the idea of a stronger Europe, particularly one able to act as a countering force to American power, has long been one of the goals of French leaders. Consider for instance, that France has historically been among the strongest advocates of the European Union regarding the development of independent defense and foreign policy capabilities. Claudie Haigneré, France's Minister of European Affairs, sought to draw upon this history to show how the constitutional treaty would offer gains to Europe and France. Haigneré (2005) pointed out that the French vision of Europe is not limited to economics. Rather, it encompassed the idea of a political Europe with the power to be an effective international actor working to promote its values throughout the world; but a against the TCE would leave France without the means to fulfill this vision.

Interestingly, policy entrepreneurs in both the Netherlands and France framed their arguments in terms of the consequences of voting either against or for the European
Constitution. This is an example of goal framing. Goal framing can be used to impact the persuasiveness of a message by either focusing on the need to avoid undesirable consequences of not engaging in a particular behavior (negative frame) or highlighting the beneficial consequences of that same behavior (positive frame) (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 167). In other words, two different approaches are used to persuade an audience and achieve a single outcome. Within the context of the constitutional debates, the use of goal framing was demonstrated in the efforts of Dutch and French leaders to convince voters of the negative consequences that not ratifying the TCE would have on Europe while also simultaneously trying to persuade voters of the benefits the treaty would bring. Thus, the negative and positive goal frames used by Dutch and French policy entrepreneurs were both aimed at encouraging the ratification of the European Constitution.

According to Levin et al. (1998), negative goal frames have been found to be more persuasive than positive frames, although this was not clearly the case in the Netherlands and France (p. 172). The explanation for this discrepancy likely lies in the fact that goal frames have not been as widely studied as other types of frames, such as risky choice framing, and that any study of goal frames has been generally done within the health and medical context, such as using positive and negative frames to influence patient choice regarding a procedure (Levin et al., 1998, p. 168). Such scenarios are far more simplistic than the political environment in which Dutch and French policy entrepreneurs applied goal framing, and thus other external factors likely impacted the
effectiveness of these frames. Consider the lack of relevance of both the negative and positive frames used by Dutch policy entrepreneurs to the issues of most concern to voters. While Dutch leaders who supported the TCE framed it in terms of grandiose themes of democracy, transparency, and a stronger Europe, these frames offered little insight into how ratification of the treaty would help resolve the issues of the economy, immigration, and the Netherlands’ role in a larger European Union. As described in previous sections, it was these latter issues that central for Dutch voters. This same problem occurred in France as well. In a country where integration was increasingly viewed as having caused more harm than good, the goal frames used by Chirac and others failed to address that which voters were most concerned about losing – the welfare state.

Framing in the Dutch and French Anti-Constitution Campaigns

Similar to the pro-constitution coalition, policy entrepreneurs in the Netherlands who opposed the constitutional treaty came from a variety of political backgrounds including parties of the radical left, the populist right, and Protestant groups (Taggart, 2006, p. 18). These groups opposed the TCE for a number of reasons, arguing that it threatened not only the Dutch social model, particularly the Netherlands’ cherished liberal policies, but also Dutch national identity (Taggart, 2006, p. 18). At the heart of these arguments was the theme of national sovereignty and the need to protect the sovereign rights of a nation in an era characterized by globalization and increasing
interdependence. This theme of sovereignty provided the central focus of the frame adopted by the treaty’s opponents in their campaign against ratification. For example, in an analysis of the Dutch referendum on the TCE, Arjen Nijeboer (2005) made reference to one opponent who, pointing to the document’s title, noted that a constitution is something that only states have (p. 404). Underlying this statement is the argument that ratification of the TCE would have forged the creation of a European state in which small states, such as the Netherlands, would be subsumed along with their diverse and unique cultural values and practices. The sentiments above were echoed by others, such as Jan Marijnissen, the leader of the Dutch Socialist Party, who claimed that if Dutch voters were to ratify the TCE, the Netherlands would be at risk of becoming a “powerless province” within the European Union (Winneker, 2005). Thus, opponents of the treaty clearly framed it as a loss for both the Dutch and the Netherlands.

In France, as in the Netherlands, opponents of the constitutional treaty constituted an amalgamation of members of various political parties from each end of the political spectrum. Interestingly, this coalition also included prominent members of the Socialist party who chose to break from their party’s official line. For treaty opponents in France, some of the central issues at stake were preserving the French vision of creating a “social Europe,” sovereignty and national identity, as well as Turkish accession and globalization (Taggart, 2006, p. 16-7). However, it was the more economic aspects of the document that were ultimately used by opponents to negatively frame the treaty. For example, in an interview originally published in the French newspaper "L’Humanité," Laurent Fabius -
former Prime Minister, leader in the Socialist party, and one of the most prominent anti-constitution policy entrepreneurs - argued that given the economic disparity between the transitional economies of the new eastern members and the established economies of old members, certain practices permitted by the Constitution would create extreme competition among members resulting in negative consequences for wages and social protections such as workers' rights (as cited in “Laurent Fabius Interview,” 2005).

Similarly, others implied that the TCE would create a “Europe dictated by finance” (“A severe,” 2005). The underlying message in statements such as these was ratification of the constitutional treaty would create a socially dispassionate European Union focused only on economic gains at the expense of ordinary citizens.

The anti-constitution campaigns in the Netherlands and France both framed the TCE in a negative manner by highlighting a single element that would be impacted by the treaty's ratification. In the Netherlands, sovereignty was the primary frame; In France, economics was used to make the case. Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth (1998) identify this technique as attribute framing, the purpose of which is to encourage either the acceptance or rejection of an object or event by framing a single attribute of that object or event as either positive or negative (p. 158). Accordingly, positive frames elicit a positive evaluation whereas a negative frame elicits negative evaluations of the object or event (Levin et.al., 1998, p. 164). Applying this to the frames used by Dutch and French opponents of the TCE, it is evident that negative frames were adopted in each case. In the Netherlands, opponents of the treaty highlighted those elements that held implications
regarding member states' sovereignty, arguing that the sovereign rights of the
Netherlands would be further whittled away in an EU that already favored larger states
over small ones. Likewise, policy entrepreneurs campaigning against the treaty in France
focused on the economically oriented parts of the TCE, portraying them as compounding
France's economic problems to the detriment of France's citizens.

As these frames suggest, anti-constitution policy entrepreneurs in both the
Netherlands and France demonstrated a keen awareness of the national moods in their
respective countries. By framing discussions of the TCE in terms of sovereignty and
economics, these policy entrepreneurs raised points that reflected the wider sentiments of
the Dutch and French voters. Consequently, the outcomes of the referenda suggest that
these policy entrepreneurs were more effectively able to frame the debates and thus wield
a greater influence over voter opinion than their pro-constitution counterparts.

Symbols in the Dutch and French Pro-Constitution Campaigns

As a means of reinforcing their chosen frames to strengthen their arguments, pro-
constitution policy entrepreneurs sought to utilize various political symbols in order to
emphasize the benefits the treaty offered. In the Dutch debate, for example, Balkenende
(2005) invoked European values, particularly freedom, human rights, rule of law, peace,
prosperity, etc (p. 7-9). These symbols were intended to communicate the notion that the
very core of Europe and European society was at stake, and the constitutional treaty
offered the best means to promote and protect these shared values. Another symbol, this
one used by the Dutch Minister for European Affairs Atzo Nicolaï, is that of European integration as a guarantor of peace and prosperity on the continent. According to Nicolaï (2005), the TCE was merely the next step in the integration process, and ratification of the treaty would ensure that Europe does not backslide into the conflict and violence that characterized the continent for much of its history.

In the case of Dutch pro-constitution policy entrepreneurs, the symbols used proved fruitless because they did not meet some of the key criteria of effective symbols. For instance, the symbols used – European values and integration – possessed little situational relevance. At the time of the referendum, and even before, the Balkenende government enjoyed little popularity among the Dutch. In fact, the Eurobarometer 62 survey revealed that the majority of Dutch citizens had little or no trust in their national government or its political parties (European Commission, 2004, p. 1). One of the important factors determining a symbol’s success, if one recalls, is the credibility of the person using the symbol. Given that pro-constitution forces were leaders of the national government and party members who did not have the trust of their constituents, it follows that the symbols used in the pro-constitution campaign lacked the situational relevance necessary to be more effective in influencing individual Dutch voters’ decisions. Furthermore, the symbols used in the pro-constitution campaign also lacked both strong cognitive and affective components. Here, again, another Eurobarometer survey, offers valuable insight. According to the survey, the Dutch are evenly split in their sense of attachment to Europe, with 49 percent feeling attachment and 47 percent feeling none
Moreover, Dutch values are some of the most liberal in Europe – the legal status of prostitution, euthanasia, and cannabis being some of the most well known examples. This suggests some difference between Dutch and European values may very well exist. If so, this difference would weaken the cognitive component of such symbols because the Dutch have a different definition of, for instance, freedom or human rights, than Europeans at large, thereby causing arguments using these symbols to ring hollow.

The use of integration as a symbol offers a good example of a symbol used by the pro-constitution campaign that lacks a strong affective component. A large portion of Dutch citizens, for example, are indifferent in their attitudes toward the European Union (European Commission, 2005). Recalling that the affective component of a symbol refers to the emotional response it elicits within the targeted audience, the neutral attitude of the Dutch towards the EU would not engender an emotional response to such a symbol as integration. As a result, integration was unlikely to have been an effective symbol in persuading Dutch voters to support the constitutional treaty. Clearly the failure to effectively frame the constitutional debate and appropriately use symbols prevented pro-constitution policy entrepreneurs in the Netherlands from coupling the TCE to the current problems and politics of most concern to Dutch citizens.

Pro-constitution policy entrepreneurs in France also attempted to utilize symbols to generate support for ratification of the constitutional treaty, yet they too were unsuccessful. As a symbol, the image of “a stronger Europe”, proved to be ineffective.
This is a result of it having had a low affective component among the French public.
Consider, for instance, the level of attachment and identification of the French with Europe. In a survey conducted by the European Commission (2000), the European Union examined how its citizens identify themselves. The survey revealed that nearly half of the French population – 44 percent – considered themselves to have little or no sense of attachment to Europe; in addition, more than one third identified themselves strictly according to nationality – that is, participants in the survey considered themselves French and only French, as opposed to European (p. 10-11). This survey helps to explain why the pro-constitution’s arguments that the TCE was good because it would create a more powerful Europe fell, for the most part, on deaf ears. The lack of attachment and identification with Europe among the French suggests that a strong sense of national identity – and pride in that identity – continues to be prevalent in France, overpowering any sense of “European-ness” to which Chirac and other TCE supporters were trying to appeal. What is more, many French, particularly since the eastern enlargement, have come to view the European Union as a threat to their French identity; where the EU once offered France security from military and economic threats, it now serves to reduce French influence and threaten jobs (“A severe crise d’identité,” 2005, d.p. 3). Such attitudes are clearly at odds with the efforts of TCE supporters to cast Europe as a positive symbol. Further enhancing this disconnect was the low approval ratings of both the Raffarin government and Chirac, which according to one source, were twenty-seven percent and thirty-six percent, respectively (Ysmal, 2006, p. 1108). Given such severe
lack of confidence among the French in the ability of their government leaders to protect
their interests, and the fact that Chirac and other TCE proponents failed to use their
chosen symbol in a manner consistent with the meaning attributed to it by the French, the
failure of these policy entrepreneurs to successfully couple the three streams is their own.

Symbols in the Dutch and French Anti-Constitution Campaigns

Echoing the negative frame of the opposition campaigns was the heavy use of
symbols. In the Netherlands these symbols directly and indirectly invoked the notion of
sovereignty. Specifically, one of the dominant slogans of the opposition’s campaign
against the TCE – “cooperation yes, handing over sovereignty no” – provides an example
of a direct use of sovereignty as a political symbol. This slogan alone touches on the
dilemma facing the Dutch voters. As a country that has been a part of the European
project since its inception, the principal conception of integration as a benefit is not
necessarily being questioned. Yet the social and economic factors at work in the
Netherlands’ political stream seem to reinforce the idea that while the Netherlands should
cooperation with the European project, it must also retain the primary ability to address
the issues it faces at home on terms compatible with Dutch values. Similarly, TCE
opponents in the Netherlands often invoked the image of a federal Europe as a means of
reinforcing the negative repercussions ratification of the treaty would likely have on
Dutch sovereignty (Winneker, 2005). Recalling that the seemingly ever-expanding
Brussels bureaucracy was one of the concerns expressed by Dutch voters in media
reports, these symbols would likely have elicited a strong emotional response among the Dutch public, suggesting that the affective component may have been strong enough to render sovereignty and a federal Europe particularly effective symbols. Opponents of the TCE, therefore, were better able to influence voter opinion towards the constitutional treaty because 1) they framed the debate in such a way that their arguments resonated with the concerns shared by voters, and 2) because they used symbols that Dutch voters felt an emotional connection to. In short, the groups opposed to the TCE were able to convince Dutch voters that the treaty did not offer the appropriate solution for resolving the prevailing issues in the country’s problem and political streams, and thereby were able to prevent the pro-constitution forces from coupling the three streams.

Treaty opponents in France also invoked a number of highly effective political symbols, which not only possessed strong affective and cognitive components, but also bore situational relevance and thus reinforced efforts to frame the TCE as a loss. Among the symbols used to great effect by France’s no-campaign were those of “social Europe,” globalization – primarily implied through references to competition and the free market – and the Bolkestein Directive. These symbols were particularly potent due to the long tradition among the French of viewing the role of the state in a particular way. As Ysmal (2006) noted, the state is widely considered to be the protector of the French citizenry, and as such must necessarily have a large role to play in all areas of life ranging from the

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8 Originally proposed on January 31, 2004, the Bolkestein Directive, named after the EU Commissioner and author Fritz Bolkestein but officially referred to as the Services Directive, was aimed at completing the EU’s internal market by liberalizing trade in services throughout member states through the removal of various administrative and legal barriers (EU Commission, 2004).
economic to the social to the cultural (p. 1108). Thus, it is from this tradition that the symbols used by the TCE’s opponents attempted to draw.

Consider, for example, how Laurent Fabius characterized the TCE. Fabius (2005) called the TCE a document that forced the French to choose “between a ‘free market Europe’ and a ‘social Europe.’” In a country suffering from chronically high unemployment and declining economic growth, Fabius clearly attempted to reinforce the sense among French voters that the promises of European economic integration have failed to materialize, and that preserving the ideal of a “social Europe” by voting against the constitutional treaty is the only way to ensure that their current circumstances have any prospect of improving. In one fell swoop, Fabius utilized two symbols likely to illicit a strong emotional response among French voters. According to an Autumn 2004 Eurobarometer survey, of the four issues identified as most pressing by the French, three – unemployment, the economic situation, and inflation – pertained to the immediate economic situation in France (European Commission, Overview of French Public Opinion section). This suggests that, as a symbol, a “free market Europe” would, through its implied negative associations with the consequences of liberalization and globalization, have had a strong affective component, one that matched the way the symbol was being used by Fabius. In other words, Fabius used a symbol – “free market Europe” – in a way that was consistent with public attitudes towards that symbol, enhancing the symbol’s power to influence public opinion.
Fabius’ use of “social Europe” as a symbol served a similar purpose, although in an opposite way. Where “free market Europe” was intended to bring forth negative attitudes, “social Europe” was intended to appeal to French attitudes regarding the role of the states, as discussed above, and advocate the expansion of such attitudes throughout the continent. That is, Fabius was calling on the French to support a Europe that would protect all Europeans through expanded social programs and services, rather than one, such as that proposed by the TCE, which would protect some but let others fall to the forces of liberalization. Thus, by using the symbol of “social Europe” to appeal to France’s vision of creating an ideal Europe, he called forth positive visions of what should be attained, and was thus able to further influence voter opinions against ratification of the constitutional treaty.

Another symbol used by the anti-constitution forces was that of the Bolkestein directive. This symbol worked to complement those of “free trade Europe” and “social Europe” because it provided a solid case example of how the European Union was moving away from the ideals inherent in the social democratic governance practices in Western Europe towards the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism. As a result, the directive was successfully used to “shed a bad light on the Constitution” (Maatsch, 2007, p. 276). The main issue for the French regarding the Bolkestein directive was its “country of origin principle,” which essentially stated that a service provider would be bound by the laws of the member state in which the provider was established (Vucheva, 2005)). According to French leaders, this principle would allow workers from member states in
the east – often referred to using the euphemism of a “Polish plumber” – to unfairly compete against French workers by adopting practices permissible under the laws of their country of origin, such as wage regulations, but not allowed under French law. Consequently, as pointed out in the *Economist* article “Are they winning?” (2005), the Bolkestein directive became “a symbol of Europe’s drift towards liberalization” (d.p. 2).

The use of the Bolkestein directive by opponents of the TCE appealed to French fears of Europe becoming more like Great Britain or the United States, and thus losing those qualities – the provision of social services for all citizens – that so many Europeans take pride in. As was the case with “free market Europe” and “social Europe” the Bolkestein directive was a symbol that had both a strong affective component and a strong cognitive component. Moreover, it was used by TCE opponents in a manner consistent with these elements. Consequently, the Bolkestein directive served as an effective symbol to support opponents’ attempts to frame the constitutional treaty as a loss.

As the previous discussion of the symbols used in the no-campaign demonstrates, the opponents of the TCE in France successfully framed the ratification of the TCE as a loss for France and Europe. Ratification of the TCE, according to opponents, would result in the destruction of France’s vision for building a “social Europe,” and instead lead the European Union on the path of further liberalization, putting French workers and French identity at risk. The use of such effective symbols, and the adoption of a frame that was supported by these symbols, helps to explain how the anti-constitution campaign
came to influence the opinions of French voters, and thus exhibited a greater influence on the outcome of the referendum, in a more effective way than President Chirac and other proponents of the constitutional treaty.

On each side of the debate on the constitutional treaty were leading members of government. As such they had both extensive political connections and a claim to hearing, which, if one recalls, were two of the important characteristics of policy entrepreneurs as identified by Kingdon. However, as the outcomes of the Dutch and French referenda show, political connections and a claim to hearing did not provide the desired outcome pushed by the pro-constitution forces. Where supporters of the constitution failed was first in framing the debate in terms that did not address the concerns of voters and, second, not using symbols that had common meanings and draw out strong emotional responses. In contrast, opponents of the treaty were able to succeed on both counts, and ultimately won the battle to couple – or, to be more accurate, uncouple - the problem and political streams with the policy stream (as represented by the TCE). Thus, by taking into account the role of the policy entrepreneurs involved in the constitutional treaty debate, the multiple streams framework provides another dimension to understanding and explaining the rejection of the TCE in the Netherlands and France.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper was twofold: 1) to consider how the mainstream media and academics explained the outcome of the Dutch and French referendum on the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2005, and 2) to determine whether the multiple streams framework was able to provide a better explanation or merely offer additional insights. While mainstream media and academic analysis did a thorough job of explaining the outcome of the referendum in terms of voter concerns, they paid virtually no attention to the impact national leaders supporting and opposing the constitution played in influencing voter opinion. This is what the multiple streams framework brings to an analysis of the referendum outcomes. By examining and explaining how influential individuals, called policy entrepreneurs, work to bring together politics, problems, and solutions through the use of symbols and framing techniques, the multiple streams framework addresses a vital element in the Dutch and French referenda. In both the Netherlands and France those national leaders, those policy entrepreneurs, who campaigned in support of the ratification of the constitutional treaty failed to use the appropriate symbols in their attempts to frame ratification as a gain for Dutch and French citizens. In contrast, the symbols used by opponents of the treaty in both the Netherlands and France were far stronger and effective, and were appropriate to attempts to frame ratification as a loss. Thus, because opponents in both countries were better able to appeal to the concerns of voters, they were able to exert greater influence over voter
opinion. In this way, the multiple streams framework offers a more nuanced explanation of the Dutch and French decisions to reject the constitutional treaty.

In order for the TCE to become EU law, the document had to be approved in all twenty five member states. With the rejection of the treaty by Dutch and French voters, the European Union was plunged into a kind of crisis. Reforms were clearly needed if the European Union was to continue to operate effectively and prepare itself for future growth and development, yet the means by which the EU had planned to achieve this had effectively been rendered moot. The European Union’s response to the Dutch and French referenda was to enter into a “period of reflection” in which EU leaders would determine how to proceed on the path of reform. This period of reflection ended relatively recently with the renegotiation of the TCE. Unlike the TCE, which was intended to consolidate and replace existing treaties, the Treaty of Lisbon, signed in December 2007, followed the European Union’s previous practice of merely amending existing treaties, and it was anticipated that the treaty would be ratified and take effect by January 2009 (Kurpas, 2007, d.p. 1-2).

Ireland, due to constitutional requirements, was the only member state to vote on the Lisbon treaty by national referendum in June 2008. The treaty was rejected, and once again efforts to reform the European Union are left in a quandry. In light of this development, an examination of the debate on the Lisbon treaty in Ireland would provide a new opportunity to further examine the utility of the multiple streams analysis.
A cursory examination of the Irish referendum yields interesting information. As was the case in the Netherlands and France, the national government and EU officials were the central supporters of the treaty, urging voters to vote yes in the referendum. Also as in the Netherlands and France, opposition parties in the government opposed ratification. Non-governmental organizations joined the debate as well.

Opponents of the treaty in Ireland, like those in the Netherlands and France, emphasized issues of national sovereignty and the development of an all-powerful European bureaucracy. For instance, Libertas, one of the leading groups of the anti-treaty campaign, argued the Lisbon Treaty was an attempt to reduce the role and power of member states and their citizens by establishing top official positions (like the President of Europe and a Union Minister of Foreign Affairs) that are not elected and therefore only accountable to Brussels (Libertas, 2008). Mary Lou McDonald, a MEP with the Sinn Fein party, also urged voters to vote against the Lisbon Treaty, which she viewed as reducing Ireland’s ability to control domestic policy. Specifically, McDonald believed the Treaty would force Ireland to harmonize its tax policies with those of other member states jeopardizing Ireland’s economic success, and would reduce the country’s influence on EU defense policy (Carroll, 2008).

Supporters of the Lisbon Treaty argued the exact opposite, pointing to the ways in which the treaty increased the power and influence of member states, particularly small ones like Ireland. For example, Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, gave several speeches in Ireland on the Lisbon Treaty. Barroso (2008)
argued Ireland’s ability to continue establishing its own tax policies would not change under the Lisbon Treaty, and the use of unanimity in the EU decision-making process on tax policy would ensure the EU cannot ignore Ireland’s interests. In addition, the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs released a white paper to educate voters on the Lisbon Treaty. According to an article in the *Irish Times*, the white paper cited various “institutional balances” created in the Treaty. These balances, such as the right of national parliaments to review new EU proposals before they become law, would guarantee that Ireland’s interests, and those of other small member states, would be given due consideration in the EU decision-making process (Fitzgerald, 2008).

This brief examination of the approaches by those in Ireland opposing and supporting the Lisbon Treaty already reveal one major difference from the debates in the Netherlands and France. In Ireland, the ‘yes’ campaign directly addressed and countered the arguments made by those of the ‘no’ campaign unlike in the Netherlands or France where the two sides approached the debate from very different perspectives. With just this piece of information, it would appear that proponents of the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland approached the debate from the right perspective. Specifically, it appears that they used the appropriate symbols to make their case in support of the Lisbon Treaty touch the concerns of Irish voters. So, if proponents in the Irish referendum supposedly used the right symbols, and yet they still “lost,” what are the implications of this on the utility of the multiple streams framework for understanding such events? Two answers to this question are immediately obvious. First, in the case of the Irish referendum, it will be
particular vital to ensure that any case study thoroughly seeks to understand the attitudes of voters towards the European Union in general and Ireland's place in it in particular, towards the future of European integration, and towards their national government. Second, a deeper examination of the literature on symbols in politics is needed to determine if other factors affecting their effectiveness exist that have not been considered in this paper.

In addition to considering the above conundrum, any multiple streams analysis of the Irish referendum must include a thorough gathering of speeches and statements from campaign leaders and coverage of the debates in the media. Moreover, post-referendum surveys done by the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and the European Commission will be valuable, as they were in analyzing the referenda in the Netherlands and France, in determining what factors most influence voters' decisions on the Lisbon Treaty. Finally, Ireland's Prime Minister, Bertie Ahern, resigned shortly before the referendum. As a main proponent of the Lisbon Treaty, understanding the circumstances of his resignation will be key in examining the political stream existing in Ireland at the time of the referendum. With this information, the referendum in Ireland on the Lisbon Treaty can be examined from a multiple streams perspective. It remains, however, unclear at this point whether such an analysis would reinforce or counter the argument presented in this paper on the utility of the multiple streams framework in the international affairs discipline.
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<th>TCE Campaigns</th>
<th>Key Players &amp; Political Parties</th>
<th>Frames (gain)</th>
<th>Frames (loss)</th>
<th>Symbols</th>
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<tr>
<td>Pro-TCE (NL)</td>
<td>Jan Peter Balkenende (PM), Christian Democrat Appeal, People's Party for Freedom &amp; Democracy, D66, Labour Party, Green Left</td>
<td>&quot;Yes&quot; vote - protect European values and peace</td>
<td>&quot;No&quot; vote - risked destabilizing peace and stability in Europe</td>
<td>European values, integration, peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pro-TCE (FR)</td>
<td>Jacques Chirac (President), Jean-Pierre Raffarin (PM), UMP, PS, UDF, Greens</td>
<td>&quot;Yes&quot; vote - create a strong Europe that could be an effective international actor</td>
<td>&quot;No&quot; vote - weakened Europe's role in international affairs, prevent Europe from protecting its interests</td>
<td>Stronger Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-TCE (NL)</td>
<td>Socialist Party, Pim Fortuyn List, Group Wilders, Reformed Political Party, Christian Union</td>
<td>no gains</td>
<td>&quot;Yes&quot; vote - erode national sovereignty</td>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-TCE (FR)</td>
<td>Laurent Fabius, PS, Greens, Communist parties, ATTAC, trade unions, National Front</td>
<td>no gains</td>
<td>&quot;Yes&quot; vote - reshape Europe in the Anglo/Saxon captalistic model</td>
<td>Social Europe, free-trade Europe, Bolkenstein Directive</td>
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Figure 1: The Multiple Streams Framework

Zahariadis (2003, p. 153)
REFERENCES


